Bailout Report

Long before their respective employers ceased to exist as independent companies, former Merrill Lynch Top North American Economist David A. Rosenberg and former Bear Stearns Chief Equities Investment Strategist Francois Trahan published research reports with explicit warnings about asset and credit bubbles in the U.S. housing and mortgage markets.

As early as August 2004, Mr. Rosenberg, Chief Economist at Merrill Lynch for North America, published a detailed analysis regarding the precarious state of the American housing market. Rosenberg warned that there could serious problems ahead in an Economic Commentary entitled: “Housing: If not a Bubble Then an Oversized Sud.”

Former Bear Stearns Chief Equities Investment Strategist Francois Trahan first published a report that raised serious questions about housing and real estate investments in a May 2005 report called “REIT all About it.” Trahan and his team at Bear Stearns followed their 2005 report with publications in 2006 that explicitly warned about the difficult future facing the U.S. housing market and even raised the possibility of a global credit crisis. The 2006 Bear Stearns reports definitively described the housing market as an unsustainable “bubble” and further cautioned that the term bubble was not one the Bear team used lightly.

It was not until 2008 that overcommitments to mortgage-backed securities (a byproduct of the housing boom), CDO’s and related products tied to residential and commercial mortgages caused Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns to suffer backbreaking losses so severe that Merrill sold itself to Bank of America and Bear Stearns narrowly avoided bankruptcy with a Fed-assisted fire sale to JP Morgan.

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In August 2007, Bear Stearns CEO Jimmy Cayne wrote to Bear investors.  Cayne’s mission that August was critically important, and he knew it.  In the wake of the shocking failure of two huge Bear Stearns hedge funds with heavy ties to the subprime mortgage market, the CEO needed to convey his confidence in the future of his company. Cayne cooly reassured investors that Bear’s conservative tradition, strong risk management culture, and plan to pare its mortgage backed securities portfolio would assure Bear Stearns a speedy and full recovery from the summer’s disastrous fund collapses.

In Cayne’s words, “You can count on us.”  Less than seven months later, Bear was purchased by JP Morgan for $10 per share.

A year later, Cayne sang a completely different tune in an interview with Fortune Magazine titled “The Rise and Fall of Jimmy Cayne.” The ex-Bear Stearns CEO revealed that the strength he projected in the summer of 2007 was in fact false strength. Fortune reported that Cayne “did not know how to deal with the devaluation of the firm’s mortgage-backed securities and other illiquid assets.  Nor did he know what to do… when two hedge funds that contained those same toxic assets collapsed and further poisoned the company’s balance sheet.”

The truth according to Jimmy Cayne himself is that Bear’s all-powerful dictator was paralyzed by indecision in the wake of Bear’s hedge fund troubles. Cayne had absolutely no idea how to cope with the company’s financial troubles.

In the CEO’s own words: “It was not knowing what to do. It’s not being able to make a definitive decision one way or the other, because I just couldn’t tell you what was going to happen.”

“I didn’t stop it. I didn’t reign in the leverage,” Cayne also admitted to Fortune.  Clearly, Mr. Cayne understood that Bear was overleveraged and blames himself for  doing  nothing about it.

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Add to the list of questionable obligations assumed by the nation’s banks in the routine course of business, $41 Billion worth of loans to directors, top executives, employees, and other insiders. 

These insider loans, generally made to high net worth individuals, most of whom have suffered significant declines in their net worth due to investment portfolio losses, could very conceiveably become bad loans given the likelihood the loan criteria used in making these loans was favored.  And to think public, tax payer money has been used to support parts of these insider loans.  Seven of the 10 banks with the largest insider loans received a total of more than $50 billion in the banking bailout late last year.

Add these perks to the outrageous bonuses and you see the public outrage has only just begun.

(Photo: Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College. Boar.  Arthur Rothstein, January 1942.  Depression era photograph captions by financial professional Cathleen Rittereiser.)

Is the furor over AIG bonuses justified or political grandstanding?  Does a 0.01% investment in salaries for the staff overseeing the wind-down of a $1.6 Trillion portfolio justify harikari as Senator Grassley suggested?

Does it take 73 millionaires to wind-down a toxic investment portfolio?

What about the bonuses paid to other Wall Street firms?  Last week Merill  Lynch was in the crosshairs for shotgunning year-end bonuses just prior to the Bank of America takeover.  Is AIG merely the culprits of the week or was the firm’s bonus behavior more egregious than that of other TARP recipients?

Typically, investment banks pay out as much salary as they net in income.  That’s nearly $10,000,000 for banks like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.  That would buy AIG’s Financial Products staff many tmes over.  On a per employee basis, the investment bank average bonuses are far higher than AIG’s for many job categories.

AIG is no exception to the conduct of other bailout recipients.  It’s employees, however, may be the victim of a slow news cycle.  News of Merril’s bonuses hit while the Madoff scandal was receiving full press news coverage.  Misuse of bailout dollars was indeed in need of a poster child.  That the message turned out to be delivered on a Most Wanted poster is testimony to the growing public outrage.

(Comic captions of Depress-era photos by financial professional Cathleen Ritterreiser.)